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IN THE MATTER OF THE ORDER 
ISSUED TO Al\tiERICAN BUYERS 
INSURANCE COMPANY AND 
PRODUCERS MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, UTAH CORPORATIONS. 
8117 
Case No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAII 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
INSURANCE CO:MMISSION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from the order of the District 
Court of Salt Lake County which upheld an order of the 
Department of Business Regulation, Insurance Commis-
sion, State of Utah, by which order the appellants herein 
were directed to cease and desist from selling, offering or 
promising to give, or allowing in any manner whatso-
ever any shares of stock or other securities issued or at 
any time to be issued, or any interest or rights therein, 
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in connection with or as an inducement to the purchase 
of any insurance. 
The facts involved in this case are rather simple 
and, as found by the Insurance Commissioner as having 
importance in the determination of this matter, are as 
follows: 
1. The record overwhelmingly establishes the fact 
that the companies here involved are insurance com-
panies. 
A. They call themselves insurance com-
panies by their names : American Buyers Insur-
ance Company; Producers Mutual Insurance 
Company. 
B. They allege that they are in the insurance 
business in their petition for review. (Para. I (c) 
& (f).) 
C. The Articles of Incorporation state that 
they have organized for the purpose of "engaging 
in the business of Life Insurance in all of its 
branches." 
D. The testimony of the representatives of 
American Buyers Insurance Company shows that 
they have in force $11,553,700 worth of insurance 
(Tr. 21); and have insured 3,679 people (Tr. 22, 
26). 
E. The testimony of the representatives of 
Producers Mutual Insurance Company shows that 
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they have in force $13,399,242 worth of insurance 
(Tr. 47); and have insured 4,658 people (Tr. 48). 
F. Both companies are in the insurance busi-
ness and are selling securities together with insur-
ance policies (Tr. 26, 47). 
2. Both companies are corporations. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT IS THEIR 
INTENTION THAT THE SALE OF INSURANCE 
BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM THE SALE OF 
SECURITIES; THAT THE MERITS OF THE INSUR-
ANCE POLICIES OFFERED BY INSURANCE COM-
PANIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE 
FROM THE MERITS OF ANY SECURITIES WHICH 
MIGHT BE OFFERED BY INSURANCE COM-
pANIES OR INSURANCE SALESMEN. 
POINT II. 
STATUTES OF OUR STATE CLEARLY DEFINE 
THE WORDS "INSURER" AND "PERSON" AND 
THE APPELLANTS ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE 
EXEMPT FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STAT-
UTES CITED UNDER POINT I ; HOWEVER, THE 
STATUTES CITED IN POINT I ARE CLEARLY 
APPLICABLE TO SAID COMPANIES. 
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POINT IV. 
THE INSURANCE CODE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVIDES FOR SERIOUS PENALTIES TO BE IM-
POSED UPON INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR THE 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 31-27-15, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAS CLEARLY INDICATED THAT IT IS THEIR 
INTENTION THAT THE SALE OF INSURANCE 
BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM THE SALE OF 
SECURITIES; THAT THE MERITS OF THE INSUR-
ANCE POLICIES OFFERED BY INSURANCE COM-
PANIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATE 
FROM THE MERITS OF ANY SECURITIES WHICH 
MIGHT BE OFFERED BY INSURAN·CE COM-
PANIES OR INSURANCE SALESMEN. 
The particular section of our Insurance Code which 
has given rise to this action is found in 31-27-15, U.C.A. 
1953, and reads in part as follows: 
No insurer, general agent, agent, broker, soli-
citor, or other person, shall, as an inducement to 
the purchase of insurance, or in connection with 
any insurance transaction, provide in any policy 
for, or offer, or sell, buy, or offer or promise to 
buy or give, or promise, or allow, in any manner 
whatsoever: 
( 1) any shares of stock or other securities 
issued or at any time to be issued or any interest 
therein or rights thereto; 
• • * 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had the 
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statutory predecessor of this section before it in the 
case of Utah Association of Life Underwriters v. Moun-
tain States Life Insurance Co., 58 Utah 579, 200 P. 673 
( 1921). On page 677 of the foregoing decision, the court 
stated as follows: 
* * * Then, again, it is manifest that the statute 
was enacted for the protection of the public and 
especially for the protection of those who are 
solicited to enter into life insurance contracts 
who may lack the experience and the opportunity 
to guard themselves against the wiles of the ex-
perienced life insurance solicitor. The statute 
should therefore be construed so as to accomplish 
its purpose and so as to protect those it intends 
to protect. If the plan that is pursued by the 
Company in disposing of its capital stock as out-
lined above is not contrary to the provisions 
of our statute, then we cannot conceive of any plan 
which merely disposed of the Company's stock 
in connection with the contract of insurance that 
would be contrary thereto. After a careful con-
sideration of all of the evidence which is not and 
cannot be contradicted or explained, we are all 
agreed that the plan pursued by the Company in 
taking subscriptions for stock in connection with 
contracts of insurance is clearly violative of the 
provisions of our statute, and if permitted by this 
court would soon lead back to the very practices 
in writing life insurance which the statute, we 
think wisely, prohibits. 
See the related statutory provision 1n Section 31-7-17, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
POINT II. 
STATUTES OF OUR STATE CLEARLY DEFINE 
THE WORDS "INSURER" AND "PERSON" AND 
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THE APPELLANTS ARE CLEARLY WITHIN THE 
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS. 
Section 31-1-10, U.C.A. 1953, defines "insurer" as 
follows: 
"Insurer" includes all persons engaged in the 
assumptiton of insurance risks. A reciprocal or 
inter-insurance exchange is an "insurer" as used 
in this code. 
Section 31-1-9 defines "person" as follows: 
"Person" means any individual, company, in-
surer, association, organization, reciprocal or 
inter-insurance exchange, partnership busjness 
. ' trust, or corporatwn. 
The appellants do not contend that they are not 
"insurers" and "persons" ~s set out in the above defini-
tions. The Department of Business Regulation, and the 
Insurance Commissioner, of the State of Utah made an 
express finding of fact that the appellants are indeed 
"insurers" and "persons", which finding was sustained 
by the District Court of Salt Lake County when the 
appellants took their appeal to that court. Therefore, 
no question is raised in this appeal as to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact of 
the Commission. 
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANTS CONTEND THAT THEY ARE 
EXEMPT FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STAT-
UTES CITED UNDER POINT I; HOWEVER, THE 
STATUTES CITED IN POINT I ARE CLEARLY 
APPLICABLE TO SAID COMPANIES. 
The main issue in this appeal for review centers 
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around the question as to whether or not these insurance 
companies are subject to the prohibitions set forth in 
the statutes above cited in Point I. The claim for exmnp-
tion rests upon Section 31-31-15 which reads as follows: 
Except as provided in this chapter, every such 
association shall not be subject to the other pro-
visions of this code unless the context clearly in-
dicates applicability to such association. 
It is noted immediately that the exemption, if any 
exists, is qualified or limited to a great degree. This 
limited exemption is to be more narrowly construed in 
view of the fact that in Section 31-31-1 we find that the 
company shall "* * * comply with all the requirements 
and provisions of this chapter, and the general insurance 
laws of Utah relative to said association * * *." 
If this last quoted portion of Section 31-31-1 is to 
have any significance at all, it would appear that we 
must find in the general insurance laws of Utah many 
places where said laws are "clearly applicable" to com-
panies that purport to be mutual benefit associations 
such as the companies before this Court. It is to be fur-
ther noted that the terms and scope of Section 31-27-15 
(quoted in Point I) are of the very broadest form; and 
under the definitions of our statutes above set out and 
the undisputed facts of this case, it must clearly appear 
that Section 31-27-15 is applicable to these companies. 
The companies here before the Court, in face of the un-
disputed evidence of their insurance company activities 
and of their corporate status, failed to introduce any evi-
dence whatsoever to show that their business was not 
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that of "the assumption of insurance risks" or that they 
are not a "person" under the meaning of our statutes. 
The pride of these companies, as indicated by the record, 
is that they have written millions of dollars worth of 
insurance, and that they have consistently used the in-
surance language and have spoken of their policies as 
insurance policies. 
It is to be further noted that the particular section 
which prohibits the activity carried on by the appellants 
is found in the Insurance Code in the chapter entitled, 
"Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices." By the same 
reasoning as used by appellants and with considerably 
more force than their argument that they are exempt 
from Section 31-27-15, the appellants could argue that 
they are also exempt from Section 31-27-3 which reads 
as follows: 
No person shall knowingly file with any pub-
lic official nor knowingly make, publish, or dis-
seminate any financial statement of an insurer 
which does not accurately state the insurer's fi-
nancial condition. 
Perhaps the appellants could argue with some force that 
they are exempt from the provisions of Section 31-27-
18 which reads as follows: 
No person shall by misrepresentations or 
by misleading comparisons, induce or tend to in-
duce any insured to lapse, terminate, forfeit, sur-
render, retain, or convert any insurance policy. 
The point to be made by this line of discussion is that 
these insurance companies who are engaged as they are 
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in the business of selling insurance cannot be reasonably 
construed to be exempt from those provisions of our stat-
utes which would prevent them from preying upon either 
other insurance companies or upon a gullible or unin-
forn1ed public. Section 31-27-15 uses the most all-inclu-
sive language that can be devised to bring everyone in 
the insurance business under its provisions. Surely this 
section is clearly applicable to appellants. 
POINT IV. 
THE INSURANCE ·CODE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVIDES FOR SERIOUS PENALTIES TO BE IM-
POSED UPON INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR THE 
VIOLATION OF SECTION 31-27-15, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953. 
Section 31-27-16 provides as follows: 
The commissioner may revoke the certificates 
of authority or licenses of any insurer, general 
agent, agent, broker, or solicitor guilty of violat-
ing any provision contained in sections 31-27-14 
and 31-27-15. 
Section 31-7-17 contains a mandatory revocation of 
an insurance company's certificate of authority when it 
violates that provision, which provision is the same in 
purport as Section 31-27-15 which was used by the Insur-
ance Commission as its authority to issue its cease and 
desist order. It is not the effect nor the purpose of the 
order of the Insurance Commission herein appealed from 
to put these companies out of business by revoking their 
certificates of authority, but the order merely requires 
that the practices of these companies in selling securities 
and selling insurance be separated. The order of the 
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Insurance Commission is clearly fair and equitable in 
face of the serious penalties set forth in our statutes. 
DISTINCTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
I. The majority of the authorities cited by the ap-
pellants are cases involving fraternal benefit associations 
which under our law, and under the statutes governing 
the cases cited, have express and unequivocal exemptions 
and, therefore, are not authorities for the proposition 
for which the appellants contend. The few cases involv-
ing mutual benefit associations are decided under statu-
tory provisions which are different from our Section 
31-31-15 and have strongly worded exemptions. How-
ever, by the sa1ne token the mutual benefit provisions 
of the insurance laws of those states are much more com-
plete and far-reaching than the very short and limited 
treatment given to the field of n1utual benefit associa-
tions in our own Insurance Code. 
II. The appellants lay considerable stress upon the 
fact that prior statutory provisions, particularly govern-
ing Inutual benefit associations, had an express prohibi-
tion against the activities such as carried on by appel-
lants; but, in the 1947 codification of our insurance laws, 
that specific prohibition was not carried over into the 
particular section of the Insurance Code dealing with 
mutual benefit associations. However, it appears to 
counsel that this is of no particular significance inasmuch 
as a careful review of the insurance sections of our pre-
vious statutes shows that almost every different type of 
insurance company named in those previous enactments 
10 
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was covered by this specific prohibition against the 
selling of stock and securities. However, when the 1947 
Code was adopted, the various specific prohibitive sec-
tions under the various types of insurance companies 
were all removed and put into a single chapter known as 
Section 31-27, and entitled "Unfair or Deceptive Acts 
or Practices" and given the widest kind of language 
so that all insurance companies were included under the 
prohibition unless there is a specific and unequivocal 
exemption therefrom. It appears that the intention of 
the Legislature was nothing more than to cut down and 
eliminate duplication in the various sections of the insur-
ance law in respect to this point, and does not appear 
to be an intent to give these companies a green light 
on acts and practices which have for many years been 
considered as unfair and deceptive. 
III. The appellants have seemed to put some stress 
upon the alleged fact that the Insurance Commissioner 
did at one time issue certificates of authority to these 
companies. It is the view of counsel that appellants have 
overstated their case when they have imputed knowledge 
to the Insurance Commissioner of activities in their 
full scope and effect as carried on by these companies. 
The record clearly shows that in the State of Utah there 
are more than 521 insurance companies certified by the 
Insurance Commissioner and it is presumptuous indeed to 
impute full knowledge of the activities of these 521 in-
surance companies to the Insurance Commissioner. It is 
true that the articles of incorporation were filed with 
the Insurance Commissioner. 
11 
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It could hardly be contended by appellants that 
should the Insurance C01nmissioner inadvertently, in-
appropriately, or wrongfully make an order, or issue a 
certificate of authority, he is forever bound by that action 
and is prevented from correcting that Inistake. Stated 
another way, it would seem clear that if an administra-
tive agency grants some order or certificates of authority 
which they have no power or right under applicable stat-
utes to grant, the order or certificate of authority so 
granted is open to attack or correction by direct action 
of the administrative agency issuing said order or grant-
ing said authority . We see by the decisions of our own 
court that the order or certificate of authority granted 
wrongfully by the Insurance Commissioner is open to 
collateral attack in the courts of our State. (See Utah 
Association of Life Underwrtiers v. Mountain States 
Life Insurance Co., supra, where the Supreme Court re-
voked the certificate of authority of the Mountain States 
Life Insurance Co. which had been issued by the Insur-
ance Commissioner under a claim of authority by said 
commissioner.) The doctrine of administrative interpre-
tation of the law cannot be binding upon the courts and is 
used only as an aid by the courts in helping resolve a 
problem which has arisen because some party has com-
plained of an action of the administrative agency, and 
certainly would not have any application where the 
agency itself has decided to correct what later experience 
has indicated to be an obvious mistake. This last line of 
reasoning is not to be taken as an admission that the 
Insurance Commissioner, prior to this time, had con-
12 
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strued the statutes of our State in the manner contended 
for by appellants. 
CONCLUSION 
It would appear to counsel that the action taken by 
the Department of Business Regulation and the Insur-
ance Commissioner is eminently fair and unquestionably 
in harmony with the facts and the law applicable thereto. 
The facts clearly establish that appellants are both "in-
surers" and "persons" within the meaning of our Insur-
ance Code and must of necessity fall clearly under the 
prohibitive language of Section 31-27-15, U.C.A. 1953. 
The only organizations given an exemption from general 
insurance laws are hospital service plans, fraternal 
benefit associations, mutual fire companies, and coopera-
tives. However, cooperatives and mutual fire insurance 
companies are by their terms specifically brought under 
Section 31-27- ; the exemption from the other part of 
the Insurance Code is unequivocal except for the places 
where they are specifically brought under other provi-
sions; the significance of this fact would seem to be that 
mutual benefit associations will be brought under many 
of the general provisions of the Insurance Code without 
the Legislature having taken the job of setting them forth 
specifically. 
It is respectfully submitted that the order brought 
to the Court for review was a proper order, amply sup-
ported, and arrived at a just result. 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
PETER M. LOWE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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